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Abstract
Background: Seroepidemiological studies before and after the epidemic wave of H1N1-2009 are useful for estimating
population attack rates with a potential to validate early estimates of the reproduction number, R, in modeling studies.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Since the final epidemic size, the proportion of individuals in a population who become
infected during an epidemic, is not the result of a binomial sampling process because infection events are not independent
of each other, we propose the use of an asymptotic distribution of the final size to compute approximate 95% confidence
intervals of the observed final size. This allows the comparison of the observed final sizes against predictions based on the
modeling study (R = 1.15, 1.40 and 1.90), which also yields simple formulae for determining sample sizes for future
seroepidemiological studies. We examine a total of eleven published seroepidemiological studies of H1N1-2009 that took
place after observing the peak incidence in a number of countries. Observed seropositive proportions in six studies appear
to be smaller than that predicted from R = 1.40; four of the six studies sampled serum less than one month after the
reported peak incidence. The comparison of the observed final sizes against R = 1.15 and 1.90 reveals that all eleven studies
appear not to be significantly deviating from the prediction with R = 1.15, but final sizes in nine studies indicate
overestimation if the value R = 1.90 is used.
Conclusions: Sample sizes of published seroepidemiological studies were too small to assess the validity of model
predictions except when R = 1.90 was used. We recommend the use of the proposed approach in determining the sample
size of post-epidemic seroepidemiological studies, calculating the 95% confidence interval of observed final size, and
conducting relevant hypothesis testing instead of the use of methods that rely on a binomial proportion.
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estimating the population attack rate (i.e. infected fraction of a
population) [4], here also referred to as the final size or the
proportion of infected individuals in a population at the end of an
epidemic. In addition, population-wide seroepidemiological surveys are useful for monitoring epidemiological dynamics in realtime, assessing effectiveness of certain interventions [5], and
determining prioritization strategies of vaccination during the
course of an epidemic (e.g. identifying subpopulations that should
be vaccinated at particular times during an ongoing epidemic)
[6,7].
Both serological and epidemiological modeling studies have
increased our understanding of the transmission dynamics of
H1N1-2009 from the beginning of the pandemic [4,8]. In
particular, the reproduction number, R, defined as the average
number of secondary cases generated by a single primary case

Introduction
Influenza A (H1N1-2009) caused the first influenza pandemic of
the twenty-first century [1]. A substantial fraction of the world
population has probably been infected already with this virus, but
a direct estimation of the infected fraction of the population is not
feasible by relying only on available epidemiological ‘case’ data
(e.g. surveillance data consisting of confirmed cases or influenzalike illness cases). In particular, influenza is known to involve
asymptomatic infections [2], and disease severity tends to be selflimiting among healthy individuals who often do not require
medical attention. Moreover, due to the non-specific nature of
symptoms, influenza-like illness is insufficient to confirm or
exclude the diagnosis of influenza [3]. Therefore, seroepidemiological studies before and after an epidemic wave are crucial for
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throughout its entire course of infection [9], was estimated using
epidemiological data during the early stages of the pandemic. One
of the important features of R is its potential to provide early and
crude predictions of the expected final epidemic size [10]. For
instance, the frequently cited initial estimate for H1N1-2009 is
R = 1.40 [8], and the final size equation of any homogeneously
mixing model (with an initially fully susceptible population)
predicts that 51.1% of the population would experience infection
by the end of the epidemic (see next section). Nevertheless, several
seroepidemiological studies have suggested that the infected
fraction was likely to be smaller than 51.1% [11], a result that
has led researchers to speculate on additional (often unforeseen)
mechanisms or factors influencing the transmission dynamics.
Hence, seroepidemiological studies play a key role in validating
crude predictions based on R. Further, whenever the observed
(sample) final size is smaller than that based on R, the use of
seroepidemiological studies may provide indirect evidence of the
positive effect of particular public health interventions.
A glance at the literature shows that various seroepidemiological
studies published so far have adopted a binomial sampling process
to quantify the uncertainty of the ‘proportion’ of infected
individuals (e.g. [12,13]). Accordingly, the confidence intervals of
the proportion have also been derived from a binomial distribution
using exact or approximate methods [6,14,15]. Perhaps one of the
main reasons for widespread use of the binomial proportion in this
context can be attributed to a well-known and simple formula for
the sample size determination of the binomial proportion [16].
Nevertheless, it should be noted that H1N1-2009 is transmitted
from human to human, and the risk of infection in one individual
depends on other individuals in the same population unit. This

highlights the need to account for the so-called ‘‘dependent
happening’’ [17,18]. Moreover, an observed final size represents a
single stochastic realization among all possible sample paths of the
epidemic, indicating a need to explicitly account for demographic
stochasticity. These issues call for a formal framework for
determining the sample size of post-epidemic seroepidemiological
studies.
The purpose of the present study is to introduce an approximate
method for the computation of the uncertainty bound of the final
epidemic size, which also permits us to discuss simple methods for
sample size calculations. We reanalyze published datasets of postpeak seroepidemiological studies of H1N1-2009 and explicitly test
if early estimates of R for H1N1-2009 indicated a biased estimate
of the final epidemic size.

Materials and Methods
Seroepidemiological data
As a way to motivate our study, we start by presenting summary
results of the seroepidemiological studies of H1N1-2009. Table 1
summarizes a total of eleven seroepidemiological studies that were
conducted after observing peak incidence of H1N1-2009 in
various populations [6,7,11–15,19–22]. If the epidemic curve
revealed a multimodal distribution with clearly distinct peaks, the
post-peak datasets can either be after the first wave (e.g. England
[14], but we restrict our interest to London and the West Midland,
because other areas were far less affected) or after the second wave
(e.g. USA [13]). The majority of studies sampled serum from
hospital laboratory, registered patients at clinics or blood donors,
except for a defined cohort population in Singapore [22] and a

Table 1. Post-peak seroepidemiological studies of pandemic influenza (H1N1-2009) among a general population.

Country

Survey location

Subjects{

Sample size{

Prop before
(%){

Prop after
(%){

Sampling
period{

After
peak1

Vac¥

Lab
method"

Australia [19]

New South Wales

Clinical chemistry
laboratories

1247

12.8

28.6

Aug–Sep 09

Yes

No

HI$40

Canada [15]

British Columbia

Patient service
center

1127

*7.5

46.0

May 10

Yes

Yes

HI$40 &
MN$32

China (1) [11]

Beijing

Blood donors and
Patients

710

*7.5

13.8

Nov–Dec 09

No

Yes

HI$40

China (2) [6]

Hong Kong

Blood donors,
pediatric cohort

2913

3.3

14.0

Nov–Dec 09

Yes

No

MN$40

Germany [7]

Frankfurt

Hospitalized adults

225

*7.5

12.0

Nov 09

No

No

HI$40

India [20]

Pune

School children &
general population

5047

0.9

15.5

Sep–Oct 09

No

No

HI$40

Japan [21]

entire Japan

Healthy individuals

6035

7.6

40.3

Jul–Sep 10

Yes

Yes

HI$40

New Zealand [12]

Auckland region

Registered patients

1147

11.9

30.3

Nov 09–Mar 10

Yes

Yes

HI$40

Singapore [22]

Singapore

Adult cohort

727

2.6

13.5

Oct 09

Yes

No

HI ($4
fold rise)

UK [14]

England

Patients accessing
health care

275

14.5

22.5

Sep 09

No

No

HI$32

USA [13]

Pittsburgh

Clinical laboratories

846

6.0

21.5

Nov 09

No

Yes

HI$40

{

Subjects, sample size and sampling period refer to those after observing the peak incidence of H1N1-2009. For several studies examining pre-existing immunity, the
same or additional samples before the 2009 pandemic were investigated at different time periods, but are not included in this Table.
{
Estimated proportions seropositive before and after observing an epidemic peak. When age-standardized estimate was given in the original study, we used it as the
population mean.
*Three studies did not estimate the proportion seropositive before the 2009 pandemic, and we assume that 7.5% of the population was initially immune based on a
crude average among other studies.
1
After peak column represents if the sampling took place longer than 1 month after observing the highest incidence of cases.
¥
Vaccination column represents if a population-wide vaccination campaign of H1N1-2009 took place prior to the sampling.
"
Laboratory methods to determine seropositivity; HI, hemagglutination inbibition assay and MN, microneutralization assay.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017908.t001

PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

2

March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e17908

Sample Size for Post-Epidemic Serological Studies

sample of study volunteers of the general Japanese population
[21]. Only the Japanese study has not been published in English;
the data are based on National Epidemiological Surveillance of
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases which are annually conducted to
understand the epidemiological dynamics of a number of
infectious diseases, involving at least 5,400 non-randomly sampled
individuals across all age-groups in each year and covering 24
prefectures (225 individuals per prefecture) among a total of 49
prefectures across Japan. Other published serological surveys were
not included in Table 1, because they were conducted before the
observed epidemic peak or because they focused on a confined
population (e.g. healthcare workers or military personnel) [5,23–
27], but a few of them have been discussed elsewhere [4].
The sample size of the eleven seroepidemiological studies, which
recorded post-peak seroprevalence, ranged from 225 to 6035
individuals. Eight studies examined seroprevalence before the first
wave, estimating the proportion of the population with preexisting immunity (Table 1). Where indicated, the sample size
estimation of those studies relied on a binomial proportion [12–
14,19]. The post-peak sampling period varied substantially with,
for example, six studies sampling the post-peak serum more than 1
month after the peak incidence. Five studies clearly stated that a
population-wide vaccination campaign against H1N1-2009 had
taken place prior to sampling. The laboratory method employed in
these studies was based on hemagglutination inhibition assays (HI)
or microneutralization assays (MN) with eight studies setting the
seropositive threshold level at HI$40. It is practically very difficult
to determine the end of an epidemic, and thus, we regard the
observed increase in seroprevalence (i.e. seroprevalence after the
peak minus that before the peak) as an estimate of the fraction of
infected individuals during the epidemic. We used the agestandardized final size estimate for an entire population when
given in the original study instead of using crude estimates of the
seropositive fraction. The 2009 pandemic involved public health
interventions, heterogeneous transmission (e.g. age and spatial
heterogeneities) and seasonality, but, as the first step to stimulate a
relevant discussion on this subject, the present study adopts a
homogeneously mixing assumption without time-dependent dynamics. Specifically, we focus on the difference between the
observed final sizes for an entire population and the predictions of
final size yielded by the modeling approach. Thus, the data in
Table 1 are analyzed here under the assumption of a well-mixed
population. It should be noted that, in the absence of any timedependent factors, the final size is known to depend only on the
reproduction number R, under the homogeneous mixing assumption [9,10].
Following the earliest studies in Mexico [8,28], the estimation of
R was conducted using the early epidemic growth data in different
locations across the world (yielding published estimates in 2009
[29–38], some reassessed [39]). The estimated R, in different
epidemic settings and subpopulations, ranged from ‘‘less than 1’’
[40] to greater than 2 [28,29,35]. The definition of R also varied
from study to study. One study, for example, incorporated the
impact of seasonal variations in the force of infection [33]. Among
these, the earliest estimate of R was derived from the early phase of
the pandemic during the Spring 2009 in Mexico using various
modeling methods [8]. Using a Bayesian method, the posterior
median of R (and the 95% credible intervals) was estimated at 1.40
(1.15, 1.90) [8]. Since the posterior median crudely represents
mid-point of estimates in other published studies, and because the
lower and upper bounds roughly correspond to the range of R in
other studies (with R,2), we focus on an estimate of R derived
from an exponential growth of cases in an outbreak in La Gloria,
Mexico. Thus, we not only assess the prediction based on R = 1.40,
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

but also on the lower and upper bounds of R. Note that the lower
bound (1.15) is smaller than the posterior median of R obtained
using other methods in the same study including a coalescent
population genetic analysis (R = 1.22). Given an estimate of R for
an initially fully susceptible population, and assuming that the
initial number of infectives is sufficiently smaller than the total
population size, the final epidemic size r satisfies
^ r),
1{r~exp({R

ð1Þ

which is referred to as the final size equation [10]. Both sides of
equation (1) represent the probability that an individual escapes
infection throughout the course of an epidemic. Since the presence
of pre-existing immunity has yet to be clarified at the beginning of
the 2009 pandemic, we use equation (1) to calculate the predicted
final epidemic size. Iteratively solving (1) for R being 1.15, 1.40
and 1.90, the final size r is 24.9%, 51.1% and 76.7%, respectively.
We test these forecasts against the observed final sizes given in
Table 1. For this reason, it is essential to compute uncertainty
bounds (e.g. 95% confidence interval) of the observed final sizes in
seroepidemiological studies.

Uncertainty bound for a binomial proportion
As a prelude to discussing the uncertainty bound of final size, we
first consider the confidence interval of a binomial proportion,
which has been widely used in published seroepidemiological
studies shown in Table 1. Let X be a binomial random variable for
sample size n, and let r = X/n be the sample proportion positive.
The most well-known, parsimonious, confidence interval of the
binomial proportion, employs a normal approximation to
binomial distribution, which is also referred to as the Wald
confidence interval. The 100(1-2a)% confidence interval for the
sample proportion r is written as

^+za
r

rﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
^ (1{^
r
r)
,
n

ð2Þ

where za denotes 1-a quantile of the standard normal distribution
(e.g. za<21.96 for a = 0.025). The ‘‘rules of thumb’’ suggest that
the normal approximation works well as long as nr.5 and n(1r).5, but the rules of thumb do not always work out well [41].
The computation of the Wilson score interval is a better
alternative, which is not computationally difficult and yields better
coverage of associated uncertainty [42,43]. Here, we focus on the
Wald confidence interval in the present study, because we extend
its principle to the computation of the 95% confidence interval of
the final epidemic size.
The idea behind the Wald confidence interval comes from
inverting the Wald test for r. Suppose that the null hypothesis
H0:r = r0 is tested where one wishes to detect a relevant
alternative H1:r?r0, where r0 is the proposed value of the
proportion. In the case of the prediction with R = 1.40, r0 might
be set at 0.511 (assuming that the final size follows a binomial
distribution). The Wald statistic to be compared to a normal
distribution is given by
^{r0
r
,
s:e:(^
r)

ð3Þ

where s.e.(^
r) is the standard error of r, approximated by the square
root term in (2).
The sample size estimation of a binomial proportion can also
employ (3). In fact, if we let m denote the margin of error, a
3
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summary of sampling error that quantifies uncertainty, which
corresponds to half the width of a confidence interval for the
proportion r, then a desired margin of error of no more than m
means
r)ƒm:
za s:e:(^

of cases in that population satisfies ([10]):


r
{ ln 1{
1{q
:
R~
r

ð4Þ

The estimated R (e.g. in the range of 1.15 to 1.90 in Mexico) is not
the basic reproduction number R0 in a fully susceptible population,
but satisfies R0 = R/(1-q) [9]. Using the estimator of R in (9), the
standard error in (8) can be rewritten as

By squaring both sides and using the approximate standard error,
we have
z2a

^(1{^
r
r)
ƒm2 :
n

vﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 2


u
u
ur3 (1{r)z s r(1{r)2 ln2 1{ r
u
m
1{q
s:e:(r)~u
:


2
u
t
r
N rz(1{r) ln 1{
1{q

ð5Þ

Solving equation (5) for n gives
z 2
a
^ (1{^
r
r),
n§
m

ð6Þ

n§

pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ!2
^ (1{^
r
r)zzb (^
rzm)(1{^
r{m)
:
m

ð7Þ

Comparing (6) and (7), it is seen that the sample size n based on
(6) corresponds to the case for a power of 50% in (7) (i.e.
zb = z0.5 = 0).

rﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
n(N{n)
zs:e:2 (r; n)
N3

Uncertainty bound for a final epidemic size
An explicit derivation of final size distribution, which employs a
recursive equation, has been carried out through the so-called
Sellke construction in a series of stochastic epidemic modeling
studies [46,47]. In addition, a number of stochastic modeling
studies in the context of large populations have examined the
asymptotic distribution of the final epidemic size via the central
limit theorem [48,49]. Within a stochastic modeling framework, it
is known that an outbreak declines to extinction without causing a
large epidemic with a probability of extinction p (small outbreaks
are referred to as minor epidemic). A major epidemic occurs with
probability 1-p. An approximate standard error of the final size of
the major epidemic based on the asymptotic convergence result of
the final size distribution is ([50,51]):
vﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
u
 2
u
ur(1{r)zR2 s r(1{r)2
u
m
,
s:e:(r)~t
N ½1{R(1{r)2

ð11Þ

where n(N-n)/N3 is an approximate variance of the binomial
sampling error, and s.e.(r;n) is the standard error of final size when
the sampling error linked to n is ignored(i.e. what we replace N by n
in equation (10)). The introduction of sampling error also applies to
the standard error of the binomial proportion in (2), but this term is
usually ignored for very large N (because n(N-n)/N3 is then negligibly
small) under an assumption that the randomly selected individuals
sufficiently represent the entire population. Thus, we use only
s.e.(r;n) in the following analyses. If n involves non-negligible fraction
of N (e.g. .5%), one may use the above expression (11) or introduce
the so-called finite population correction factor (FPC) for the
calculation of the error [52].
Given an observed final size r, the 100(1-2a)% confidence
interval for r is calculated as
vﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 2


u
u
^
s
r
2 2
3
ur
^(1{^
r
r) ln 1{
r)z
u^ (1{^
m
1{q
^+za u
r
:


2
u
t
^
r
^ z(1{^
n r
r) ln 1{
1{q

ð8Þ

where r now represents the observed final size and possibly the
unique positive solution to (1) in case of an initially fully susceptible
population. R is the reproduction number while m and s denote
the mean and standard deviation of the generation time (and thus,
s/m is the coefficient of variation (CV)), and N is the population
size. This approximation has been evaluated elsewhere [50,51]. If
a proportion q of the population is initially immune, the
reproduction number R estimated from an exponential growth
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

ð10Þ

Given that q and the CV of the generation time are now known for
H1N1-2009, the Wald confidence interval can employ (10) for
computing the corresponding 95% confidence interval, for
hypothesis testing and for estimating the minimum sample size
required for post-epidemic seroepidemiological studies. One should
bear in mind that the error estimate is nevertheless conservative (i.e.
likely to be underestimated), because (i) the method is based on
normal approximation, (ii) we ignore time-dependent dynamics
including public health interventions, and (iii) we ignore heterogeneous transmission (see Discussion for (ii) and (iii)). N is the
population size in the above expressions. If we wish to replace N by
sample size n, the binomial sampling error of n has to be accounted
in the calculation of the variance. In the case of simple random
sampling, the resulting standard error is given by the sum of the
respective variance of two independent processes, i.e.

a well-known formula for estimating the minimum sample size n
for a binomial proportion. Since the eventual r is unknown
before the actual survey, one may set r = 0.511 or use a
published seroprevalence estimate. It should be noted that
equation (6) does not explicitly account for Type II error (i.e.
power of the test) [44]. Hence, to incorporate the power in
calculating the sample size, one can alternatively employ the
following formula ([45]):
za

ð9Þ

ð12Þ

Suppose that we have an unbiased estimate of q and a known CV
of the generation time (e.g. from separate datasets). To compare
the observed final size r against the prediction based on R = 1.40,
r0 would be 0.511, with the Wald statistic compared to a normal
distribution given by
4
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Results
^ {r0
r
vﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ

:
 2
u
u 3
^
r
s
2
2
ur
^ (1{^
r)z
r
r) ln 1{
u^ (1{^
1{q
m
u


2
u
^
r
t
^z(1{^
n r
r) ln 1{
1{q

Confidence intervals

ð13Þ

Table 2 summarizes the empirical results of eleven seroepidemiological studies of H1N1-2009. The sample proportion infected
ranged from 4.5% to 38.5%. The smallest three final sizes resulted
from samples within 1 month after observing peak incidence, and the
largest three involved a population-wide vaccination campaign prior
to the survey. Whereas the 95% confidence interval of the binomial
proportion was narrow with the standard errors ranging from 0.6%
to 1.6%, the 95% confidence interval of final size was much broader
ranging from 6.6% to 76.9%, which led to include 0% within the
confidence limits of seropositive in nine studies, calling for ad-hoc
truncation (or calling for an alternative method of computation that
may include the F distribution). The broader uncertainty bound
from the model-based final size than the binomial proportion can be
analytically demonstrated as follows. First, the smallest standard
error in (12) is seen when the CV of the generation time is 0, i.e.,

pﬃﬃﬃ
Let n(r)~s:e:(r) n. The minimum sample size which explicitly
accounts for only Type I error is calculated from
z 2
a
n(^
r)2 :
n§
m

ð14Þ

If we account for both Type I and II errors, we have


za n(^
r)zzb n(^
rzm) 2
:
n§
m

ð15Þ

vﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
u
^ 3 (1{^
r)
r
^+za u
r
u 

2 :
t
^
r
^z(1{^
n r
r) ln 1{
1{q

It should be noted that the method used to account for the power
(equation (15)) can only examine the range of r,1-q-m because the
approximate standard error of final size includes the logarithmic
function.
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Because 0#r#1 and 0#q#1, we have

Application and illustration
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To highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for the
variance of the final size distribution, the following two exercises
are performed. First, we examine post-peak seroepidemiological
studies of H1N1-2009, comparing the 95% confidence intervals
generated by two methods; binomial proportion and asymptotic
final size distribution. For this reason, when calculating the
uncertainty bounds, we regard the data as if they were generated
from a binomial process or the final epidemic size of a
homogeneously mixing population. For simplicity, we assume that
we have an unbiased estimate of the proportion of population with
pre-existing immunity based on the observed seropositive
proportion prior to the epidemic wave in Table 1. We consider
uncertainty of the observed final size, which corresponds to the
difference in infected fraction before and after observing the peak
incidence. Subsequently, we test the significance of the observed
final size against model predictions (i.e. 24.0%, 51.1% and 76.7%
based on R = 1.15, 1.40 and 1.90, respectively). The mean and
standard deviation of the generation time are fixed at 2.7 and 1.1
days, respectively (and so, the CV is 0.41) based on contact tracing
data in the Netherlands [40]. To address the uncertainty with
respect to the shape and scale of the generation time distribution,
we also consider hypothesis testing of two other scenarios in which
the CV is 0 (i.e. a constant generation time) and 1 (i.e.
exponentially distributed generation time).
Second, as sensitivity analysis of the selected empirical
illustrations, we present the desired minimum sample size of
final epidemic size by employing the approximate standard
error of the final size. Examining various margins of error
ranging from 0% to 50% with R being 1.15, 1.40 and 1.90 and
the CV of the generation time ranging from 0 to 1, the above
mentioned formulae (14) and (15) are used with significance
level at a = 0.05 and, for the latter formula, the power is set at
12b = 0.80. Moreover, for this sensitivity analysis the proportion of the population with pre-existing immunity q is fixed at
7.5%, which corresponds to the mean based on eight published
studies in Table 1. Subsequently, we also examine the
sensitivity of the minimum sample size required as a function
of R and q.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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The equality holds when r = 1.

Hypothesis testing
Assuming CV of the generation time at 0.41, six serological
studies appeared to have yielded significantly smaller final sizes
than that predicted by R = 1.40 (Table 2). Nevertheless, four of
the six studies sampled serum within 1 month after observing
peak incidence, and four of the remaining five studies with
insignificant result sampled serum longer than 1 month after the
peak (no significant association between the significant test result
and sampling within 1 month after the peak; p = 0.24, Fisher’s
exact test). Populations in four of the six studies with significantly
smaller final sizes were unvaccinated prior to sampling, and
three of the five studies with insignificant results involved
vaccination prior to the survey (p = 0.57, Fisher’s). Taken
together, five of the six studies with significantly smaller final
sizes sampled serum within 1 month after peak incidence or
examined unvaccinated population, while all the five remaining
studies with insignificant test results conducted sampling longer
than 1 month after the peak or the population involved
vaccination (p = 0.55, Fisher’s). When comparing observed final
sizes against R = 1.15, results of all studies were not found to be
significantly different. Eight studies indicated that the observed
final sizes were significantly smaller than that predicted by
R = 1.90. Varying the CV of the generation time from 0 to 1
with R = 1.40, the significance levels with CV = 0 did not vary
from those of CV = 0.41, but the results with CV = 1 indicate
5
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Table 2. Uncertainty bounds and hypothesis testing of the post-peak seroepidemiological studies of influenza (H1N1-2009).

Country

Sample
size{

Prop
infected
(%){

95% CI of
binomial
prop (%){

95% CI
of final
size (%){

After
peak1

Vac¥

P-values$

R
1.40

1.15

1.90

1.40

1.40

0.41

0.41

0.41

0

1

CV

Australia [19]

1247

15.8

13.8, 17.9

0, 50.2

Yes

No

*0.02

0.30

*,0.01

*0.01

0.07

Canada [15]

1127

38.5

35.7, 41.4

16.5, 60.6

Yes

Yes

0.13

0.89

*,0.01

0.11

0.21

China (1) [11]

710

6.3

4.5, 8.1

0, 46.8

No

Yes

*0.02

0.18

*,0.01

*0.01

0.05

China (2) [6]

2913

10.7

9.6, 11.8

0, 67.8

Yes

No

0.08

0.31

*0.01

0.07

0.15

Germany [7]

225

4.5

1.8, 7.3

0, 56.0

No

No

*0.04

0.22

*,0.01

*0.03

0.09

India [20]

5047

14.6

13.6, 15.6

0, 30.1

No

No

*,0.01

0.10

*,0.01

*,0.01

*,0.01

Japan [21]

6035

32.7

31.5, 33.9

19.8, 45.6

Yes

Yes

*,0.01

0.88

*,0.01

*,0.01

*0.02

New Zealand [12]

1147

18.4

16.1, 20.6

0, 81.4

Yes

Yes

0.15

0.42

*0.03

0.13

0.23

Singapore [22]

727

10.9

8.6, 13.1

0, 94.4

Yes

No

0.17

0.37

0.06

0.15

0.24

UK [14]

275

8.0

4.8, 11.2

0, 35.3

No

No

*,0.01

0.11

*,0.01

*,0.01

*0.01

USA [13]

846

15.5

13.1, 17.9

0, 100.0

No

Yes

0.32

0.45

0.21

0.31

0.37

{

Sample size refers to the number of enrolled subjects to measure the seroprevalence after observing an epidemic peak. Proportion infected is given by the proportion
after observing peak minus the proportion before the peak in Table 1.
95% confidence intervals (CI) show lower and upper confidence intervals of the proportion. The 95% CI of binomial proportion is derived from a normal approximation
to binomial distribution, while the 95% CI of final size is similarly derived from the Wald method employing asymptotic convergence result of final size distribution.
1
After peak column represents if the sampling took place longer than 1 month after observing the highest incidence of cases.
¥
Vaccination column represents if a population-wide vaccination campaign of H1N1-2009 took place prior to the sampling.
$
p-values are based on two-sided Wald test employing the approximate standard error of final epidemic size.
R, the estimated reproduction number in Mexico against which we would like to test our hypothesis; CV, the coefficient of variation of the generation time. Significant
difference is indicated by * mark followed by p-value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017908.t002
{

that only three observed final sizes were significantly smaller
than that predicted by R = 1.40.

with pre-existing immunity q (with fixed R = 1.40). Interestingly, the
minimum sample size hits the largest value around q = 0.20. For
example, q = 0.212 yielded the largest sample size with CV = 0. This
can be inspected by taking first and second derivatives of (16) with
respect to q (with the CV = 0), leading to:

Sample size estimation
Figure 1 shows the minimum sample sizes required for postepidemic seroepidemiological studies to test the final size against
R = 1.15, 1.40 and 1.90 with CV being 0, 0.41 and 1. Whereas
median (and lower and upper quartiles) sample size of empirical
studies in Table 1 was 1127 (710, 2913), such sample sizes can only
explicitly prove a difference from the prediction of R = 1.90 at a
margin of error 5%. To argue the significant difference from
prediction based on R = 1.40 with the identical margin of error
and with varying CV of the generation time 0.41 (range: 0, 1), we
ideally need 8665 (range: 7215, 15947) individuals at the power of
50% and 16121 (13423, 29680) individuals at the power of 80%.
At the margin of error 10%, these numbers are reduced to 2167
(1804, 3987) and 3715 (3093, 6841), respectively. As R gets closer
to the lower uncertainty bound, and as the variance of the
generation time becomes larger relative to the mean, the
minimum sample size required increases.
Figure 2A examines the sensitivity of the minimum sample size to
the reproduction number R. Ignoring pre-existing immunity (q = 0),
R = 2 with the CV of the generation time 0.41 (0, 1) requires at least
201 (177, 320) individuals at power of 50% and 317 (281, 500)
individuals at power of 80%. As R is reduced and approaches the
critical level, much greater sample sizes are required. For instance,
the minimum sample size for R = 1.2 is more than 2-fold higher
than that required for R = 1.4. Figure 2B illustrates the relationship
between minimum sample size and the proportion of the population
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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which is the most difficult situation in which the hypothesis testing
against the predicted final size requires us to collect an
unrealistically large number of blood samples. qmax leads the
denominator of the approximate standard error in (16) to be 0.

Discussion
We have introduced a framework to compute the uncertainty
bounds of the final epidemic size that employs the Wald
approximation, an approach motivated by the absence of a
readily available methodology to estimate the sample size of postepidemic seroepidemiological studies. Published seroepidemiological studies of H1N1-2009 so far have computed the confidence
interval of the observed final size as if it were a binomial
proportion. However, the data generating process behind the
dynamics of infectious diseases involves dependence between
infected individuals [17], which does not lead to a binomial
proportion. Moreover, the observed final size represents a single
stochastic realization among all possible sample paths (i.e. all
6
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Figure 1. Minimum sample sizes required for post-epidemic seroepidemiological studies of final size as a function of the margin
error, the reproduction number, and the coefficient of variation of the generation time. (A & B) Sample size with three different
reproduction numbers as a function of the margin of error. (A) employs an estimation formula based Type I error alone (at a = 0.05), while (B)
accounts for both Type I and II errors (at a = 0.05 and 12b = 0.80). The margin of error represents random sampling error, around which the reported
percentage would include the true percentage. Since (A) is a special case of (B) (with b = 0.50), R = 1.40 in (A) is also shown as dotted line in (B). The
coefficient of variation (CV) of the generation time and the proportion of population with pre-existing immunity are fixed at 40.7% and 7.5%,
respectively. (C & D) Sample size with three different coefficients of variation as a function of the margin of error. (C) accounts for Type I error alone
(a = 0.05), while (D) accounts for both Type I and II errors (a = 0.05 and 12b = 0.80). The reproduction number and the proportion of population with
pre-existing immunity are fixed at 1.40 and 7.5%, respectively. CV = 0 corresponds to a constant generation time, whereas CV = 1 represents an
exponentially distributed generation time. In (B) and (D), several lines are truncated, due to impossibility to account for larger margins of error in the
estimation formula.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017908.g001

seroepidemiological studies published to date did not necessarily
indicate an overestimation of prediction based on R = 1.40, and
moreover, all the observed final sizes did not reveal significant
deviation from prediction with the lower limit R = 1.15. Published
seroepidemiological studies agree that the upper bound R = 1.90
(and thus, other published estimates of R.2 [29,30]) was likely an
overestimation [39]. One may still speculate that R = 1.40 may well
be an overestimation (because all of the observed final sizes were

possible probabilistic trajectories of the epidemic), requiring us to
consider stochastic variations in the data. To account for these
issues, we employed the approximate standard error of the final
size given as a convergence result of a homogeneously mixing
stochastic epidemic model. The calculation of the standard error
was shown to be simple to compute (spreadsheet programs are
sufficient). By applying the proposed uncertainty bound of final
size to influenza (H1N1-2009), we have also shown that all the
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 2. Sensitivity of minimum sample size for post-epidemic seroepidemiological studies to the reproduction number and the
proportion of population with pre-existing immunity. (A). The minimum sample size with three different coefficients of variation (CVs) as a
function of the reproduction number. (B). The minimum sample size with three CVs as a function of the proportion of population with pre-existing
immunity. In (A), the proportion of population with pre-existing immunity is fixed at 0, and the estimates correspond to the margin of error of 10%
and Type I and II errors at a = 0.05 and 12b = 0.50, respectively. In (B), the reproduction number is fixed at 1.40, and the estimates correspond to the
margin of error of 10% and Type I and II errors at a = 0.05 and 12b = 0.50, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017908.g002

conservative uncertainty bounds. The proposed method has a
potential for explicitly discussing a posteriori effectiveness of
interventions through the direct comparison of observed final sizes
in different settings. Hence, we believe that the proposed
calculation of the 95% confidence interval will greatly help
progressing this area of research. It should also be noted that the
use of the proposed uncertainty bounds plays an important role
especially for influenza transmission with R,2 (Figure 2A).
Our illustration of the proposed method posed four technical
challenges for the computation of the uncertainty bound of final
size; (i) the coefficient of variation of the generation time has to be
known, (ii) the proportion of pre-existing immunity before an
epidemic critically influences the bounds, (iii) sampling of several
seroepidemiological studies took place shortly after an epidemic
peak and (iv) vaccination and other public health interventions
during the course of an epidemic can modify the observed final
size. As for (i), the present study demonstrates a critical need to
estimate the variance of the generation time in addition to the
mean. That is, the distribution of the generation time plays a key
role not only in estimating R [53,54] but also in characterizing the
variance of final epidemic size. With respect to (ii), although we did
not include seroepidemiological studies prior to the 2009
pandemic [24,25,27], we have shown that such a survey of q is a
key to determine the sample size after the epidemic [55]. In
addition to the estimation of q itself, it should be noted that our
method adopted an assumption that the pre-existing immunity
offered a complete protection from infection (i.e. all-or-nothing
protection). If the pre-existing immunity is imperfect and described
by the so-called leaky protection (e.g. partial reductions in
susceptibility per contact and in infectiousness upon infection),
those quantifications will be required in addition to the estimation
of the proportion of the initially immune population. Issues (iii)
and (iv) pose further technical challenges to precisely estimate
uncertainty bounds of seroprevalence in empirical studies. Given

smaller than 51.1%), but the sample sizes of published seroepidemiological studies turned out to be too small to answer this question.
Although formulae for variance of the final size distribution (i.e.
the square root of which we regarded as an approximate standard
error) has been known among stochastic modeling experts [50],
the present study extended its use to the computation of the 95%
confidence interval of the observed final size by replacing the
reproduction number by its estimator. This also led us to consider
a parsimonious Wald test and sample size estimation. What the
present study suggests for post-epidemic seroepidemiological
studies is to employ the proposed formula (12) to calculate the
95% confidence interval and (14) or (15) to help determine the
sample size for seroepidemiological surveys. For the latter, the
following simplification of (14) might be useful:
sﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ


 2
^
r
s
2 2
3 (1{^
^
^
r
)z
ln
1{
r
(1{^
r
)
r
1{q
m
n(^
r)2



~
: ð20Þ
n§
^
r
s:e:(^
r)
^ z(1{^
s:e:(^
r) r
r) ln 1{
1{q
The standard error s.e.(^
r) is calculated by using the specified
confidence interval (i.e. twice the margin of error) and the
confidence level (i.e. nominal coverage probability). For instance, if
the margin of error is 5% and the confidence level is 95%, the
standard error is 0.05/1.96 = 0.025. Similarly, the standard error
is 0.030 and 0.020 at the confidence levels of 90% and 99%,
respectively. It is worth stressing that the purpose of post-epidemic
seroepidemiological studies is not necessarily to test the observed
final size against a predicted value, but includes real-time
monitoring of an epidemic and various considerations of public
health interventions. As long as there is no better alternative
method for computing the uncertainty, the proposed approach
should also be used for those other purposes to calculate
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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that the observation of incidence is given in every discrete time
unit, a possible way forward may be to employ a parsimonious
discrete time stochastic model (e.g. branching process or chain
binomial model) [56], which may well enable us to draw the 95%
confidence interval in a given reporting interval by conditioning
the distribution to previous reporting intervals. Proposing simple
methods to address these issues is part of our future studies.
Our method relied on the homogeneous mixing assumption and
ignored time dependent factors that include seasonality and public
health interventions. In this sense, the proposed uncertainty is
regarded as an underestimate, because the time-dependent
variations in the transmission potential can increase the variance
of the final size distribution, and also because heterogeneous
transmission (e.g. age-dependent mixing) can also increase
variance (e.g. an epidemic with extremely high assortativity could
generate multimodal final size distribution for an entire population
[57]). If an intervention is focused only on a portion of cases or if
disease-induced deaths occur in non-negligible order, not only the
variance but also the formulae for the final size relation (our
equation (1)) have to be reassessed [58–60]. Moreover, in the
presence of strong seasonality, a deterministic modeling study has
demonstrated a very limited predictive performance of R alone in
anticipating the final epidemic size [61,62]. Given that seroepidemiological studies tend to stratify population by age-group (to
capture the age-dependency of the risk of infection), and
considering that the final size of age-structured models can be
different from that of homogeneous population [63], further work
could at least incorporate heterogeneous mixing by employing the
existing similar convergence result of the final size distribution

using a multitype epidemic model (e.g. age-structured model). An
elegant formula for the asymptotic final size distribution of
multitype epidemic models has been derived by Ball and Clancy
[64], yielding a variance matrix (which is similar to but a little
more complicated than that discussed in the present study).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the elements of the nextgeneration matrix (or the reproduction matrix) would be included
as the solution of the final size equation for multitype models
[64,65], and those cannot be simply replaced by the estimator of R
using final size (i.e. as was done in the present study using
homogeneous model), and thus, the computation of 95%
confidence interval may well require full quantification of the
next-generation matrix (in addition to observation of final sizes for
each type).
Each of the abovementioned issues should be addressed in the
future, ideally in the context of empirical applications. Until that
time, rather than relying on a binomial proportion, we
recommend the use of the approach introduced in this study if
the goal is to determine the sample size of post-epidemic
seroepidemiological studies, to calculate the 95% confidence
interval of observed final size, or to conduct relevant hypothesis
testing.
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Outbreak of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) in a Finnish garrison–a
serological survey. Euro Surveill 15: pii = 19709.
27. Ikonen N, Strengell M, Kinnunen L, Osterlund P, Pirhonen J, et al. (2010)
High frequency of cross-reacting antibodies against 2009 pandemic
influenza A(H1N1) virus among the elderly in Finland. Euro Surveill 15:
pii = 19478.
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40. Hahné S, Donker T, Meijer A, Timen A, van Steenbergen J, et al. (2009)
Epidemiology and control of influenza A(H1N1)v in the Netherlands: the first
115 cases. Euro Surveill 14: pii = 19267.
41. Brown LD, Cai TT, DasGupta A (2001) Interval estimation for a binomial
proportion. Stat Sci 16: 101–133.
42. Agresti A, Coull BA (1998) Approximate is better than ‘‘exact’’ for interval
estimation of binomial proportions. Am Stat 52: 119–126.
43. Wilson EB (1927) Probable inference, the law of succession, and statistical
inference. J Am Stat Assoc 22: 209–212.
44. Cohen J (1977) Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. New York:
Academic Press.
45. Lachin JM (1981) Introduction to sample size determination and power analysis
for clinical trials. Control Clin Trials 2: 93–113.

PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

10

March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e17908

